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The tool was developed with the intend of being able to test all the common security 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Research Background 
In the beginning of the Web the pages were static. They only used to show content 
with minimal interactivity and functionality. From that time the Web has evolved a 
great deal bringing so called web applications available for the users of the Web with 
the same kind of functionality previously only used in desktop applications. There are 
now bidirectional communication web applications, for example for watching videos, 
reading emails and writing documents, and they are available for users of the Web as 
long as they have a device equipped with a modern browser. 
In order to deliver these kind of applications as web applications the usage of various 
technologies is required. They have to be able to handle a huge amount of network 
traffic and at the same time serve countless concurrent web application users. Also, 
these technologies need to be as efficient as possible from the network traffic 
amount and performance point of view. 
When bringing new technologies to the world of the Web, the security of web 
applications is one of the most important matters to consider along with 
functionality and efficiency. Without proper security decisions already made during 
the planning phase of a new technology data confidentiality, integrity or availability, 
any of the three tenets of traditional information security could potentially be 
compromised. 
WebSocket is one of the technologies used to bring bidirectional communication and 
the needed security, functionality, and efficiency to web applications. However, 
some of the security decisions are made during the development phase of a service, 
and some of them are configurable later on by a WebSocket service provider. Still all 
of the decisions can affect the overall security of any WebSocket implementation. 
This is one of the reasons why the testing of WebSocket and its security is necessary 
in the same way as with all the other web technology. 
This thesis analyzes how WebSocket implementations are implemented on the Web, 
what the common security issues in them are, how those security issues can be 
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tested, and whether it is possible to develop a tool capable of carrying out the major 
part of the WebSocket implementation testing. 
1.2 Commissioner 
The Security Testing of WebSockets research is made for a company called Silverskin 
Information Security. Silverskin Information Security is a Finnish security consultancy 
company with roughly 20 employees. 
1.3 Problem Definition 
Commonly available web security testing tools such as Burp Suite or OWASP ZAP are 
unsuitable for testing the security of a WebSocket implementation automatically. 
This leaves it as a manual task requiring extensive knowledge of how the 
implementations work, what the common security issues in them are, and how they 
can be security tested. The objective is to develop a tool that is able to test the 
security issues in WebSocket implementations easily with intermediate level 
knowledge of security issues in WebSocket implementations. 
In order to reach the objective it needs to be understood what the common security 
issues in WebSocket implementations are. Issues can reside on multiple levels; 
therefore, clear scoping must be set to only limit the issues to WebSocket alone. 
With knowledge of common security issues available, the reader must understand 
how these security issues can be tested in theory and in practice. This requires deep 
technical knowledge of the WebSocket protocol security and web security testing 
tools. 
In order to develop the tool commonly available programming languages must be 
analyzed to find a language with production-quality WebSocket libraries available. 
After choosing the appropriate programming language  the tool must be designed, 
implemented, and tested. It might be that some of the security issues are on a level 
that cannot simply be tested with this kind of tool but instead requires deeper 
understanding of the specific implementation. This might then lead to a decision to 
exclude some security issues from the scope of the tool. 
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1.4 Research Methodology 
In order to reach the set objectives, a proper research method must be chosen. A 
design research based approach with qualitative methodologies was chosen for this 
thesis where the research aims to develop a completely new tool. 
Design research is used to solve a problem or to improve a previously known matter 
(e.g. a product). This research obeys both facts as the problem is well known and the 
steps for improving the security testing process are known. 
There are two separate processes in design research: 
 Development work, with a target. E.g. a process, a product, a service or an 
action.  
 Research, which is the process where the actual thesis is created. 
Development work follows a known process for the phenomenon whereas research 
follows the research process and methods that are dependent on the actual 
phenomenon and its nature. The researcher must understand the target of 
development and the development process. The actual research work is targeted at 
the beginning and the ending stages of the tool development process. (Kananen 
2012, 45.) 
Qualitative methodologies in this research are split into four sections. (Kananen 
2012, 93.): 
 Planning includes scoping, the research problem, a literature overview for 
theory parts, and validity. 
 Information gathering includes observation, theme interview, and literature 
sources. 
 Analysis includes programming, categorization, and content analysis. 
 Interpretation includes conclusions and validity. 
All of these methods are used during this research process in order to reach the set 
objectives. 
1.5 Literary Overview 
WebSocket has been analyzed from a security point of view in the past by other 
researchers. Tomi Fagerlund published a paper titled Websocket-protokollan 
10 
 
 
tietoturva selainsovelluksissa [WebSocket protocol’s security in web applications] in 
2014. Fagerlund’s research was based on WebSocket as a technology in comparison 
to other similar technologies and theoretical review on WebSocket security issues. 
(Fagerlund 2014.) 
A short paper titled WebSocket Security Analysis was published by Jussi-Pekka Erkkilä 
in 2012. Erkkilä’s analysis details the security issues in WebSockets and what kind of 
steps could be taken to mitigate them. (Erkkilä 2012.) 
The focus of the publications mentioned above has been more theoretical than that 
of this research. 
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2 WebSocket Protocol 
2.1 History of WebSockets 
Historically, developing web applications that need bidirectional communication 
between a client and a server has required abusing HTTP (Hypertext Transfer 
Protocol) to achieve the required functionality. Abuse of HTTP for bidirectional 
communication leads to suboptimal use of HTTP connections, causing unnecessary 
problems for communication parties. A simpler solution would be to use a single TCP 
connection for traffic in both directions instead of abusing the HTTP protocol. 
In June 2008 a step to solve this problem was taken in the working draft 10 of HTML5 
specification, where the project name for this new functionality was TCPConnection, 
a TCP-based socket API (W3C 2008). Later on in July 2008 in the HTML5 specification 
the functionality was renamed to WebSocket. WebSocket was introduced with the 
following objectives. (Comet Daily 2008.): 
 Seamlessly traverse firewalls and routers. 
 Allow duly authorized cross-domain communication. 
 Integrate well with cookie-based authentication. 
 Integrate with existing HTTP load balancers. 
 Be compatible with binary data. 
The WebSocket protocol was originally developed by the W3C and the WHATWG 
group, however, it was moved under development of IETF in February 2010. After 
multiple years of draft versioning, IETF published a finished version of WebSocket 
protocol (RFC 6455) in December 2011 (Hickson and others 2010). The WebSocket 
protocol was now ready to combine a single TCP connection with the WebSocket API 
(WSAPI) providing an alternative to HTTP polling for bidirectional communication 
between the client and the server. (Fette and others 2011, 1-4.) 
2.2 Bidirectional Communication in Web Applications 
Developing web applications that need bidirectional communication between a client 
and a server has required various HTTP communication methods with varying usage 
requirements. Nowadays, the most widely used method, Long-polling, involves 
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abusing HTTP to poll the server for updates while sending upstream notifications as 
distinct HTTP requests. (Fette and others 2011, 4.) 
Commonly used methods (Chopra 2015, 11-12) are listed below: 
 Request/Response: A mechanism in which the client sends a request to the 
server and receives a response. This process is driven by some interaction 
such as the click of a button on the webpage to refresh the whole page. 
When Asynchronous JavaScript and XML (AJAX) entered the picture, it made 
the webpages dynamic through the usage of JavaScript automation and 
helped in loading some part of the webpage without loading the whole page 
again. 
 
 Polling: A mechanism for scenarios where data needs to be refreshed without 
user interaction, such as the score of a football match. In polling, the data is 
fetched after a set period of time and it keeps hitting the server, regardless of 
whether the data has changed or not. This causes unnecessary requests to 
the server, opening a connection and then closing it every time. 
 
 Long-polling: A mechanism abusing Request/Response where the connection 
kept open for a particular time period. When the client uses long polling the 
server responds to the client only after the data is ready to be sent, which 
differs from the traditional Request/Response method where the response is 
sent to the client right after the request. This is one of the ways to achieve 
real-time communication, but it works only with known time intervals. 
The fact that all of these methods utilize HTTP for communication introduces a 
variety of problems. (Fette and others 2011, 4.): 
 The server is forced to use a number of different underlying TCP 
(Transmission Control Protocol) connections for each client: one for sending 
information to the client and a new one for each incoming message. 
 
 The wire protocol has a high overhead, with each client-to-server message 
having a HTTP header.  
 
 The client-side script is forced to maintain a mapping from outgoing 
connections to incoming connection to track replies. 
The WebSocket protocol was designed to supersede the existing bidirectional 
communication technologies that utilize HTTP as a transport layer to benefit from 
the existing infrastructure (proxies, filtering, authentication). The WebSocket 
protocol addresses the problems of existing bidirectional HTTP technologies in the 
context of existing HTTP infrastructure. The WebSocket protocol is designed to work 
over HTTP ports 80 and 443 as well as support HTTP proxies and intermediaries even 
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if this implies some complexity specific to the current environment. However, the 
design does not limit the WebSocket protocol to HTTP, and future implementations 
could use a simpler handshake than the currently used one, over a dedicated port 
without reinventing the entire protocol. (Fette and others 2011, 4-5.) 
2.3 WebSocket Benefits 
WebSocket is not the only technology to provide bidirectional communication 
between the client and the server; however, currently it is the most efficient one. 
The list of the benefits of the WebSocket protocol according to Chopra (2015, 3-4) as 
follows includes: 
 Full-duplex communication. 
 Low bandwidth consumption. 
 Security. 
 Low latency. 
 Works over Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) (although it needs HTTP for 
initial handshake). 
 Supported by almost all the web browsers and web servers including mobile 
browsers. 
The typical usage case for the WebSocket protocol is to use it in a web application 
running on a server that simultaneously handles WebSocket and traditional HTTP 
requests with a browser as the client. This does not limit the use of the WebSocket 
protocol to browser applications – it can also be used in any client or server 
application. This makes the efficiency of WebSocket protocol utilizable e.g. with 
desktop applications. 
2.4 WebSocket Browser Support 
Browser vendors quickly adapted by providing the support for the WebSocket 
protocol. After the release of the RFC 6455 standard in December 2011, Chrome 
released the support for the WebSocket protocol during the same month within their 
software version 16 (Webkit 2011), compared to Firefox where support for the 
WebSocket protocol was relesed within their version 11 in March 2012. (Mozilla 
Developer Network 2016.) 
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The WebSocket protocol support in different browsers is listed in Table 1. (Wikipedia 
2016.): 
Table 1. The WebSocket protocol support on modern browsers (supported since 
version). 
WebSocket 
protocol 
Internet 
Explorer 
Firefox 
(PC) 
Firefox 
(Android) 
Chrome 
(PC, 
Mobile) 
Safari 
(Mac, 
iOS) 
Opera 
(PC, 
Mobile) 
Android 
Browser 
13 RFC 
6455 
10 11 11 16 6 12.10 4.4 
 
As can be seen in Table 1, all the major browser brands currently support usage of 
the WebSocket protocol. 
Separate non-browser related libraries for creating client side WebSocket 
implementations are available for different programming languages – e.g. 
ClientWebSocket for .NET and websocket-client for Python. These libraries are used 
in applications that are not used as browser applications. 
2.5 Relationship to TCP and HTTP 
The WebSocket protocol is an independent TCP-based protocol. Its only relationship 
to HTTP is that its handshake is interpreted by HTTP server as an Upgrade request to 
upgrade a connection from HTTP to a WebSocket connection. By default, the 
WebSocket protocol uses port 80 for unencrypted WebSocket connections and port 
443 for encrypted WebSocket connections tunneled over Transport Layer Security 
(TLS) in the same way as in HTTPS. (Fette and others Ltd 2011, 11.) 
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3 WebSocket Communication 
3.1 Overview 
The WebSocket protocol used with web applications begins its connection to the 
server with a simple HTTP request. A browser or another client that supports 
WebSocket send the server a request with specific HTTP headers that asks for a 
connection upgrade to use WebSocket. This process is called an opening handshake. 
(Lombardi 2015, 112.) 
After the upgrade to use WebSocket has been agreed between the parties, a 
WebSocket connection is established. The client or the server can then send data 
both ways (full-duplex) in binary format. Depending on the opcode used in 
WebSocket frame, the WebSocket protocol converts the provided UTF-8 encoded 
text to binary format for transit and then converts it back to UTF-8 encoded text or 
just transits the data in binary format without data format conversions. The 
connection is closed after one of the parties has sent a closing handshake. 
The possibility to upgrade a connection with a header was introduced in HTTP/1.1 
standard (RFC 2616) to allow the client to notify the server of alternate means of 
communication. It is primarily used at this point as a means of upgrading HTTP to use 
WebSocket or HTTP/2. (Lombardi 2015, 112-113.) 
Table 2 lists the headers used during the WebSocket opening handshake with the 
explanation of every HTTP header and its value. Additional headers can be used if the 
application’s developer wants to use them e.g. for additional security or 
functionality. 
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Table 2. List of possible WebSocket headers during the opening handshake. 
(Lombardi 2015, 115.) 
HTTP header Required Explanation 
Host Yes 
Header field containing a host name of server from 
where a WebSocket service is requested. 
Upgrade Yes 
websocket as a static value. Used to notify the 
WebSocket server to which protocol connection is 
upgraded. 
Connection Yes 
Upgrade as a static value. Used to notify the 
WebSocket server of alternate means of 
communication. 
Sec-WebSocket-Key Yes 
Nonce, randomly generated base64-encoded value by 
the WebSocket client. When decoded, is 16 bytes in 
length. 
Sec-WebSocket-Version Yes 
A version of the WebSocket protocol with which the 
client is attempting to communicate. 13 is the latest 
version of the WebSocket protocol. If the WebSocket 
client requests a version that is not supported by the 
WebSocket server, the WebSocket server responds 
with a list of supported WebSocket versions. 
Origin No 
Optional header field used to identify from where a 
request was originated. 
Sec-WebSocket-Accept 
Yes 
(server-
side) 
Nonce, randomly generated value by a WebSocket 
server that is used to identify the connecting party in 
the future communication. 
Sec-WebSocket-Protocol No 
Optional header field with a list of values indicating 
which protocols the WebSocket client would like to 
speak, ordered by preference. 
Sec-WebSocket-Extensions No 
Optional header field with a list of values indicating 
which extensions the client would like to speak. 
3.2 WebSocket Uniform Resource Identifiers 
The WebSocket specification (RFC 6455) specifies two Uniform Resource Identifiers 
(URIs) that can be used with the WebSocket protocol: 
ws-URI format: "ws:" "//" host [ ":" port ] path [ "?" query ] 
This format is used with non-encrypted connections of the WebSocket 
protocol. 
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wss-URI format: "wss:" "//" host [ ":" port ] path [ "?" query ] 
This format is used with TLS-encrypted connections of the WebSocket 
protocol. This requires the WebSocket server to have certificates 
configured. 
The WebSocket protocol utilizes the PKI infrastructure with TLS-encrypted 
connections. The WebSocket client connecting to the WebSocket server must be able 
to trust the authority that signed the certificate for the WebSocket server in order to 
enable a secure connection between the parties.  
3.3 Opening Handshake 
Before being able to send WebSocket messages between the WebSocket client and 
the WebSocket server, it requires that the opening handshake to be completed 
between the parties. Typically, in a web application, the opening handshake process 
starts by a user accessing a website where WebSocket communication is used. The 
browser then downloads a JavaScript code from the server and runs it with browser’s 
interpreter and instructs the browser to open a WebSocket connection to the 
WebSocket server prescribed in the code.  
The client-side JavaScript code and used WebSocket JavaScript library must contain 
details for the WebSocket connection opening. To open a new WebSocket 
connection from a browser, at minimum, the JavaScript code must contain a 
WebSocket URI (Uniform Resource Identifier). WebSocket connections in browser 
applications can occur with browser integrated JavaScript API (integrated to a 
browser by the browser vendor), which handles the WebSocket communication in a 
browser context. An example URI could be ws://ws-example-site.com for a non-
encrypted connection or wss://ws-example-site.com for an encrypted connection. 
Additional optional and standardized HTTP headers like Sec-WebSocket-Protocol can 
be used to select a specific WebSocket protocol. Other non-standardized HTTP 
headers can be used e.g. for authenticating the user to the service. (Lombardi 2015, 
113.) 
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An example opening handshake request sent by a browser based WebSocket client is 
illustrated as follows: 
GET /websocket-example/ HTTP/1.1 
Host: ws-example-site.com 
Upgrade: websocket 
Connection: Upgrade 
Sec-WebSocket-Key: x3JJHMbDL1EzLkh9GBhXDw== 
Sec-WebSocket-Version: 13 
Origin: http://ws-example-site.com 
All the opening handshake request properties are explained in Table 3. 
Table 3. Explanation of every property in the opening handshake request. (Fielding 
and others 2014, 6.7; Lombardi 2015, 115.) 
Request property Explanation 
GET /websocket-example/ 
HTTP/1.1 
• GET - Indicates the used HTTP method used during the 
communication. 
• /websocket-example/ - Indicates the resource name from where 
the WebSocket service is requested. 
• HTTP/1.1 - Indicates the HTTP version used. 
Host: ws-example-site.com Domain name for the WebSocket service. 
Upgrade: websocket 
Used to notify the WebSocket server to which protocol the 
connection is upgraded. 
Connection: Upgrade 
Used to notify the WebSocket server of alternate means of 
communication. 
Sec-WebSocket-Key: 
x3JJHMbDL1EzLkh9GBhXDw== 
Nonce, randomly generated base64-encoded value by the 
WebSocket client. When decoded, is 16 bytes in length. 
Sec-WebSocket-Version: 13 The version of the WebSocket protocol. 
Origin: http://ws-example-
site.com 
Origin from where the WebSocket service was called. 
 
When the handshake request is sent and received by the WebSocket server, it must 
respond on it. An example response by the WebSocket server is illustrated as follows: 
HTTP/1.1 101 Switching Protocols 
Upgrade: websocket 
Connection: Upgrade 
Sec-WebSocket-Accept: s3pPLMBiTxaQ9kYGzzhZRbK+xOo= 
All the opening handshake response properties are explained in Table 4. 
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Table 4. Explanation of every property in the opening handshake response. (Fielding 
and others 2014, 6.7; Lombardi 2015, 115.) 
Response property Explanation 
HTTP/1.1 101 Switching Protocols 
• HTTP/1.1 - Indicates the HTTP version used. 
• 101 Switching Protocols - HTTP response status code 
indicating that the WebSocket server has accepted to switch 
the protocol to the WebSocket protocol. 
Upgrade: websocket 
Used to confirm the WebSocket client to which protocol the 
connection is upgraded. 
Connection: Upgrade 
Used to confirm the WebSocket client of alternate means of 
communication. 
Sec-WebSocket-Accept: 
s3pPLMBiTxaQ9kYGzzhZRbK+xOo= 
Nonce, randomly generated value by the WebSocket server 
that is used to identify the connecting party in the future 
communication. 
 
3.4 WebSocket Frame 
When the communication channel between the WebSocket client and the 
WebSocket server has been established, the parties can start to communicate 
between each other with WebSocket messages. WebSocket messages use 
WebSocket frames to communicate. Because the communication between the 
WebSocket client and the WebSocket server is bidirectional, either party can send 
data back and forth at any time, as long as no close frame (closing handshake) was 
previously sent. (Lombardi 2015, 115.) 
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3.4.1 WebSocket Frame Format 
A high-level overview of the framing is illustrated in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1. WebSocket frame format. 
According to Fette and others (2011, 28-30), segments of the WebSocket frame are 
described as the following: 
FIN: 1 bit 
Indicates that this is the final fragment in a message. The first fragment 
may also be the final fragment. 
RSV1, RSV2, RSV3: 1 bit each 
Must be 0 unless an extension is negotiated that defines meanings for 
non-zero values. If a nonzero value is received and none of the 
negotiated extensions defines the meaning of such a non-zerovalue, the 
receiving endpoint must fail the WebSocket connection. 
Opcode: 4 bits 
Defines the interpretation of the Payload data. If an unknown opcode is 
received, the receiving endpoint must fail the WebSocket connection. 
The following values are defined: 
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 %x0 denotes a continuation frame 
 %x1 denotes a text frame 
 %x2 denotes a binary frame 
 %x3-7 are reserved for further non-control frames 
 %x8 denotes a connection close 
 %x9 denotes a ping 
 %xA denotes a pong 
 %xB-F are reserved for further control frames. 
Mask: 1 bit 
Defines whether the Payload data is masked. If set to 1, a masking key 
is present in masking-key, and this is used to unmask the Payload data. 
All frames sent from the WebSocket client to the WebSocket server 
have this bit set to 1.  
Payload length: 7 bits, 7+16 bits, or 7+64 bits 
The length of the Payload data, in bytes: If 0-125, that is the payload 
length. 
 If 126, the following 2 bytes interpreted as a 16-bit unsigned 
integer are the payload length. 
 If 127, the following 8 bytes interpreted as a 64-bit unsigned 
integer (the most significant bit must be 0) are the payload 
length.  
 Multibyte length quantities are expressed in network byte 
order. 
Note that in all cases, the minimal number of bytes must be used to 
encode the length, for example, the length of a 124-byte-long string 
cannot be encoded as the sequence 126, 0, 124. The payload length is 
the length of the Extension data + the length of the Application data. 
The length of the Extension data may be zero, in which case the 
payload length is the length of the Application data. 
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Masking-key: 0 or 4 bytes 
All frames sent from the WebSocket client to the WebSocket server are 
masked by a 32-bit value that is contained within the frame. This field is 
present if the mask bit is set to 1 and is absent if the mask bit is set to 0. 
See Section 5.3 for further information on client-to-server masking. 
Payload data: (x+y) bytes 
The "Payload data" is defined as "Extension data" concatenated with 
"Application data". 
Extension data: x bytes 
The Extension data is 0 bytes unless an extension has been negotiated. 
Any extension must specify the length of the Extension data, or how 
that length may be calculated, and how the extension use must be 
negotiated during the opening handshake. If present, the Extension 
data is included in the total payload length. 
Application data: y bytes 
Arbitrary Application data, taking up the remainder of the frame after 
any Extension data. The length of the Application data is equal to the 
payload length minus the length of the Extension data. 
It is important to note that the representation of data in frames is 
binary, not ASCII characters. As such, a field with a length of 1 bit that 
takes values %x0 / %x1 is represented as a single bit whose value is 0 or 
1. 
Masking is used to mask the Payload data uniquely to prevent cache 
poisoning attacks against proxy servers. Masking is mandatory for 
messages sent from the WebSocket client to the WebSocket server, but 
is not used at all with messages sent from the WebSocket client to the 
WebSocket server. 
3.4.2 Fragmentation 
One WebSocket message can include one or more frames depending on how the 
WebSocket server and the WebSocket client decide to send data back and forth. 
Splitting message into multiple frames is called fragmentation. 
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With the ability to fragment WebSocket messages, a party (a WebSocket client or a 
WebSocket server) would have to buffer the entire message before sending so it 
could send back an accurate count of frames. With the ability to fragment, the 
endpoint can choose a reasonably sized buffer, and when it is full, send another 
frame as a continuation until sending of the entire message is complete. (Lombardi 
2015, 119.) 
Fragmentation is controlled with the FIN-bit within the WebSocket frame like it was 
described under chapter 3.4.1 WebSocket frame format. 
3.5 Closing Handshake 
Closing of an established WebSocket connection requires a frame to be sent with an 
opcode of 0x08. If the WebSocket client sends the close frame, it must be masked 
like with every WebSocket message, however, it is not masked when sent by the 
WebSocket server. 
Closing frame may contain information about why the connection was closed. 
Information contains a status code and a message. The status code is passed in the 
body of the message as a 2-byte unsigned integer. The reason string (message) is a 
UTF-8 encoded string. Table 5 lists the pre-defined close frame status codes in the 
WebSocket protocol specification (RFC 6455). 
Table 5. The pre-defined close frame status codes in the WebSocket protocol. 
(Lombardi 2015, 120.) 
Status 
code Reason Description 
1000 Normal closure An application has successfully completed. 
1001 Going away 
A WebSocket server or a WebSocket client application is shutting 
down or closing without expectation off continuing. 
1002 Protocol error A connection is closing with a protocol error. 
1003 Unsupported data 
A WebSocket client application or a WebSocket server application 
has received a message off an unexpected type that it cannot 
handle. 
1004 Reserved Reserved range for a future use as per RFC 6455. 
1005 No status rcvd No valid code was received. 
1006 Abnormal closure A connection has closed abnormally. 
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1007 
Invalid frame 
payload data 
A message received was not consistent with the type off the 
message (e.g., non-UTF-8). 
1008 Policy violation 
A message received has violated a policy. This is a generic status 
code that can be returned when there are no more suitable status 
codes. 
1009 Message too big A message received was too large to process. 
1010 Mandatory ext. 
An extension that was requested from the WebSocket server was 
not returned in the WebSocket handshake. 
1011 Internal error A connection is terminated due to an unexpected condition. 
1012 Service restart 
A WebSocket service is restarted, and a WebSocket client that 
reconnects should do so with a randomized delay off 5-30 
seconds. 
1013 Try again later 
A WebSocket server is overloaded and a WebSocket client should 
either connect to a different IP (given multiple targets), or 
reconnect to the same IP when user has performed an action. 
1014 Unassigned Unassigned and not in use. 
1015 TLS handshake A TLS handshake has failed. 
  
The close frame status codes listed in table 5 are only listing the status codes that are 
pre-defined in the WebSocket protocol specification (RFC 6455). Other status code 
ranges are also available for custom usage. Table 6 lists the status code ranges that 
can be used in other situations. 
Table 6. Close frame status code ranges in the WebSocket protocol. (Lombardi 2015, 
121.) 
Status code range Description 
0-999 Not used for status codes. 
1000-2999 
Status codes are either defined by RFC 6455 or will 
be in future revisions. 
3000-3999 
Reserved for libraries, frameworks, and 
applications. 
4000-4999 
Reserved for private use, and is not registered 
with the IANA. Feel free to use these values in 
your code between the WebSocket client and the 
WebSocket server with prior agreement. 
3.6 WebSocket Subprotocols 
The WebSocket protocol provides a support for subprotocols that can be used to 
support multiple applications under the same WebSocket server. The WebSocket 
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client can request that the WebSocket server use a specific subprotocol by including 
the Sec-WebSocket-Protocol header field in its WebSocket opening handshake. If it is 
specified, the WebSocket server needs to include the same field and one of the 
selected subprotocol values in its response for the connection to be established. 
(Fette and others 2011, 12.) 
The WebSocket protocol specification defines the recommended naming of 
subprotocols. The recommendation is to use names that contain the ASCII version of 
the domain name of the subprotocol's originator. For example, if a Company were to 
create a Chat subprotocol to be implemented by many servers around the Web, they 
should name it "chat.company.com". If they would like to implement a newer 
version of the Chat subprotocol for simultaneous use, they could use subprotocol 
"chat2.company.com", then the two subprotocols could be implemented by 
WebSocket servers simultaneously, with the WebSocket server dynamically selecting 
which subprotocol to use based on the value sent by the client. (Fette and others 
2011, 12.) 
3.7 WebSocket Extensions 
Extensions provide a mechanism for implementations to opt-in to additional protocol 
features. Extensions can be developed freely. To use extensions, the WebSocket 
client may request extensions to be used with the WebSocket connection by 
including the Sec-WebSocket-Extensions header field in its WebSocket opening 
handshake. The WebSocket server may then accept some or all extensions requested 
by the WebSocket client. (Fette and others 2011, 48-50.) 
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4 WebSocket Security Issues 
4.1 State of the WebSocket Security 
WebSocket is not an exception when it comes to security issues in web technologies. 
Many of the security controls that are available for general web technologies are also 
available for WebSocket. But like always, the responsibility of knowing and 
implementing security controls into a WebSocket application is left for the developer 
and/or the admin of the service. 
When a human is involved in securing applications’ implementations, sometimes, the 
security controls that are available are totally left unimplemented or are 
implemented wrongly. In most cases, this is due to the developer not knowing how 
the security controls should be implemented. It could also be due to lack of time or 
any other reason.  
If security is not part of the application since the requirements phase, it usually 
results with big problems later on. Security is something that can be hard and costly 
to implement, but even more costly if it needs to be implemented to a ready product 
afterwards. This is because it usually requires major changes to the whole 
application. It is important to understand that the best way to secure any application 
is to have security relevant support processes used with the development. This set of 
processes is called as Security Development Lifecycle (SDL). It helps the whole 
development process to reach the necessary security state of an application. 
(Microsoft.) 
Without having the knowledge of the current security state of an application, one of 
the best ways is to a make a penetration test for the application by a trusted party. In 
the penetration testing, the implementation (e.g. a working web application) is 
tested for possible vulnerabilities by utilizing different kind of tools and techniques to 
find out vulnerabilities that might exist in the application. The penetration testing 
can also include a code review, where the application’s source code in reviewed for 
finding out and confirming vulnerabilities. The penetration testing is part of standard 
SDL processes. 
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In addition to penetration testing, when in production, the application or the 
surrounding infrastructure should have an ability to detect attacks occurring against 
the application. Allowing attackers to repeatedly attack the application to discover or 
exploit vulnerabilities that have not been protected against can lead to major issues. 
Capability to detect attackers trying to discover or exploit vulnerabilities as a security 
control should not be underestimated. 
4.2 Authentication 
Authentication is a way to verify a legitimate user to a service. According to Fette and 
others (2011, 53), the WebSocket protocol does not prescribe any particular way that 
WebSocket servers can authenticate clients during the WebSocket handshake. 
On web applications one of the most commonly seen methods of implementing 
authentication is a form-based authentication. Using the Set-Cookie header field, an 
HTTP server can pass name/value pairs and associated metadata (called cookies) to a 
client (e.g. browser). In the form-based authentication, the client is assigned with a 
name/value pair after the user is successfully authenticated to the service. When the 
client makes subsequent requests to the server, the client returns the name/value 
pair as a part of the Cookie header. (Barth and others 2011, 3.) 
When combining the form-based authentication with a WebSocket service, the 
actual authentication must happen before the WebSocket handshake. The assigned 
the name/value pair received after the authentication is used with the WebSocket 
handshake as a part of the Cookie header field. Figure 2 illustrates the process. 
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Figure 2. The form-based authentication used in a WebSocket service. 
In WebSocket the authentication does not necessary need to occur by using the 
form-based authentication. The WebSocket server can use any client authentication 
mechanism available to a generic HTTP server, such as any cookie field value, basic 
authentication, digest authentication, or certificate authentication. As long there is a 
possibility to authenticate the user in a secure manner and the WebSocket server 
verifies it, the authentication mechanism in question is suitable for use. 
When there is no defined authentication solution prescribed in the WebSocket 
protocol, it leaves the implementation of authentication to developer’s shoulders. 
The developer might then build a custom authentication scheme, but building it 
correctly from a security point of view, can be challenging and could lead to serious 
security issues. For example, an attacker could bypass the whole authentication 
process and access the data served by the application. 
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4.3 Authorization 
Authorization ensures that the authenticated user has appropriate privileges to 
access resources. The resources the user have access usually depends on the user’s 
role in the service. 
With authorization, the term Principle of Least Privilege is usually mentioned. It 
means that the user should only have access to resources, that the user is able to 
perform an assigned job task, nothing else. In case of WebSocket, authorization is 
heavily application context dependent. There are three possible scenarios that could 
occur: 
 An attacker is able to access a function that requires higher-level 
authorization to the WebSocket service than originally assigned for the user. 
 An attacker is able to access a function that shows other user’s restricted 
content. 
 An attacker is able to access the WebSocket service that requires a user 
authorization, without any authorization. 
Figure 3 illustrates the listed attack scenarios. 
  
Figure 3. Attacks against authorization levels. 
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In the first case, the attacker is able to access functions above the authorization level 
assigned. The attacker has level 1 authorization, but is able to access level 2 
functions. 
In the second case, the attacker is able to access functions on the same authorization 
level of another user. 
In the third case, the attacker is able to access functions of any authorization level 
without any assigned authorization level. 
In vulnerability categorization, cases one and three are called vertical privilege 
escalation and case two is called horizontal privilege escalation. From security point 
of view, all three scenarios are problematic and can lead to serious issues, since the 
attacker is able to access resources that should be out of reach. 
4.4 Cross-Domain Requesting 
WebSocket uses the origin-based security model, which is commonly used by web 
browsers. This means that when a user performs a WebSocket opening handshake 
request, the web browser adds an HTTP header named Origin to the request. The 
Origin header field is used to protect against unauthorized cross-origin use of a 
WebSocket server by scripts using the WebSocket API in a web browser. (Fette and 
others Ltd 2011, 7.) 
An example WebSocket opening handshake request illustrated below: 
GET /websocket-example/ HTTP/1.1 
Host: ws-example-site.com 
Origin: ws-example-site.com 
Upgrade: websocket 
Connection: Upgrade 
Sec-WebSocket-Key: x3JJHMbDL1EzLkh9GBhXDw== 
Sec-WebSocket-Version: 13 
Origin: http://ws-example-site.com 
As it can be seen from the example, the server is informed of the script origin 
generating the WebSocket opening handshake request (Origin: ws-example-
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site.com). If the WebSocket server does not wish to accept connections from this 
origin, it can choose to reject the request by sending an appropriate HTTP error code. 
Browser clients send this header field by default; for non-browser clients, this header 
field may be sent if it makes sense in the context of those clients. (Fette and others 
Ltd 2011, 7.) 
The problem with cross-domain requesting is that if the WebSocket service should 
only be available from predefined locations, without the proper validation of origin, 
an attacker could use the service from any other, potentially malicious origin. Figure 
4 illustrates how an example Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking (CSWSH) attack could 
occur for a victim using a legitimate service on https://www.example-site.com with a 
web browser. 
 
Figure 4. Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking attack. 
At first, the victim is tricked into accessing a malicious web site called https://evil-
website.com with the victim’s web browser. The attacker’s web site contains a 
JavaScript code that instructs the victim’s browser to open a WebSocket connection 
to a legitimate https://ws-example-site.com service. When the browser makes the 
WebSocket opening handshake request, it adds the authentication header (e.g. 
token=125838121231) to the request that was assigned for the victim when accessed 
the legitimate service before the scenario happened. Now when the legitimate 
server inspects the incoming WebSocket opening handshake request, it checks that 
the token is valid and proceeds with the opening handshake normally and opens the 
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WebSocket connection. The legitimate server did not validate the request origin and 
the code loaded from attacker’s web site can use the WebSocket service maliciously. 
4.5 Traffic Encryption 
Encryption is used to convert data into another format, called ciphertext, which can 
only be read by authorized parties. Without the usage of encryption, appropriately 
positioned attacker is able listen the communication between the two 
communication parties. This is called as Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attack, which is 
illustrated in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5. Man-in-the-Middle attack. 
If an attacker is able to position like illustrated in Figure 5, in theory the attacker 
could read and modify all the communication data. This will result in problems with 
data confidentiality and integrity. 
Masking used with WebSocket frames does not protect the data from MitM attacks, 
since the key used to mask the data is part of the WebSocket frame. According to 
Fette and others (2011, 51-52), masking was implemented to prevent proxy cache 
poisoning attacks, not MitM attacks. Cache poisoning attacks are attacks against a 
user of a service. Attacks occur when an attacker is able to insert malicious code to 
the cache of a proxy server, that is used by the client with the service. 
According to Fette and others (2011, 11), by default, the WebSocket protocol uses 
port 80 for regular WebSocket connections and port 443 for WebSocket connections 
tunneled over Transport Layer Security (TLS). TLS is not automatically enabled 
between the parties and must be configured for the WebSocket service separately. 
It must be noted that not all the available TLS cipher suites can be trusted to be 
secure. Attacks like BEAST, can be used compromise the security of TLS protocol, if 
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the implementation of the service is done against the best practices. (Qyalys SSL 
LABS 2014, 8.) 
4.6 Input Validation 
4.6.1 Description 
In context of vulnerabilities in web applications, input validation refers to failure to 
properly handle input arriving from the client or the server. Handling input 
improperly can lead to different kinds of vulnerabilities in web applications, such as 
interpreter injection (e.g. SQL, LDAP, or HTML), file system attacks and buffer 
overflows. The server should never trust data arriving from the client, since it has 
every possibility to tamper with the data. (OWASP 2013.) 
Attacks that are targeted against input validation can be split into two main 
categories: 
 Attacks that are directed against the user of the application. 
 Attacks that are directed against the server of the application. 
Figure 6 illustrates some of the attacks that are targeted against both of the 
categories. 
 
Figure 6. Example attacks against the client and the server. 
From security point of view, both of the scenarios are problematic and can lead to 
serious security issues, since the attacker is able to affect the code or commands run 
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at either end’s interpreter, maliciously. Normally this kind of ability to affect the code 
ran on either end is out of reach for the attacker. 
4.6.2 Server-Side Injection Attacks 
SQL injection is one of the most serious forms of injections in web applications. It is 
caused because the server-side code does not handle the user input in a safe way. 
Example server-side code is shown below for an application login function: 
uName = getRequestString("UserName"); 
uPass = getRequestString("UserPass"); 
sql = "SELECT * FROM Users WHERE Name ='" + uName + "' AND Pass 
='" + uPass + "'" 
Like it can be seen from the code content of sql variable, the values from uName and 
uPass variables are simply added as part of the SQL query that will be run by a SQL 
interpreter later on. Using this functionality legitimately by submitting “admin” as 
the uName and “password123” as the uPass the SQL query would be the following: 
SELECT * FROM Users WHERE Name = ’admin’ AND Pass = 
‘password123’ 
If one or more username with the submitted password is found from the database’s 
Users table (SQL server returns one or more records), the login is successful. This 
kind functionality can be easily exploited, by submitting a malicious code as the 
input. The attacker could submit “admin” as the uName and “’ OR ‘1’=’1“ as the 
uPass. The SQL query would be the following: 
SELECT * FROM Users WHERE Name = ‘admin’ AND Pass = ‘’ OR ‘1’=’1’ 
This will transform the SQL query in a way that the SQL server always returns one 
record, the admin record and the login will occur as the admin user. 
Injection attacks against the server-side can be easily avoided by utilizing 
parameterized queries. With parameterized queries the user input cannot affect the 
structure of the query, it only accept the user input as the parameter value. With SQL 
servers, Stored Procedures or Prepared Statements are used to provide 
parameterized queries to avoid SQL injections. 
35 
 
 
4.6.3 Client-Side Injection Attacks 
In many cases, a proper encoding has the potential to defuse attacks that rely on lack 
of input validation. In case of HTML injection, if HTML entity encoding is used on the 
input before it is sent to a browser, it will prevent most of HTML injection attacks 
(e.g. cross-site scripting [XSS]). HTML entity encoding means replacing ASCII 
characters with their “HTML Entity” equivalents (e.g. replacing the “<” character with 
“&lt;”). This would then result the browser handling the input as content of an 
element, instead of handling it as a start of a HTML tag. (OWASP, 2013.) 
An example of the HTML injection attack could occur through the following server-
side code: 
(String) page += "<input name=’creditcard’ type=’TEXT’ value='" + 
request.getParameter("CC") + "'>"; 
The form gets a value for its input called creditcard, from a parameter called CC, 
which is provided by a user as a URL parameter. Legitimate example of a CC 
parameter in a request could be the following: 
 https://ws-example-site.com/function?CC=1234567890 
In this case, form’s input value would be“1234567890”. An attacker can leverage this 
functionality and modify the request into a malicious format: 
https://ws-example-
site.com/function?=’><script>document.location='https://evil-
website.com/cookiecatcher?foo='+document.cookie</script>’ 
With the malicious request, the value “’><script>document.location='https://evil-
website.com/cookiecatcher?foo='+document.cookie</script>’” is added to the form. 
This will result the browser’s interpreter running the following code: 
<input name='creditcard' type=’TEXT’ 
value='’><script>document.location='https://evil-
website.com/cookiecatcher?foo='+document.cookie</script>’'>"; 
The code instructs the browser to run a script to redirect the browser to a malicious 
http://evil-website.com/ web site and include the Cookie’s name/value pairs used 
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with the ws-example-site.com web site as an URL parameter. The attacker can record 
all the requests sent to the malicious web site and use the sent Cookie’s name/value 
pairs to pose as the victim on the legitimate ws-example-site.com web site. 
4.6.4 Protecting Against Input Validation Related Attacks 
In order to protect against input validation related attacks, the user and the server 
input must be sanitized (input sanitization). This means that the input must be 
stripped out or converted out of malicious input, that the system can then process 
the data in a safe way without causing problems to the user or the server of the 
application. 
The best way to understand the protection against input validation related attacks is 
that the data originating from the client-side to the server-side as well as the data 
originating from the server-side to the client-side must be validated for a malicious 
input. The input should never be able to inject the client-side or the server-side code 
maliciously (e.g. SQL, LDAP or HTML). 
The protection against client-side injections can be accomplished with proper 
encoding and the protection against many of the server-side injections can be 
accomplished by utilizing parameterized queries. 
It must be noted that creating a system that can defend against all kind of input 
validation related attacks could be hard to implement. Many of the frameworks or 
other ready input validation libraries provide functionalities that can handle the 
input in a safe way, without the developer needing to create own security controls 
against these kinds of attacks. Utilizing ready functionalities are usually the safest 
way on approaching this problem. The most important thing is that when 
implemented, it must be centralized and used with all input. 
4.7 Resource Exhaustion 
Resource exhaustion is a simple denial of service condition, which occurs when the 
resources necessary to perform an action are entirely consumed, therefore 
preventing that action from taking place (OWASP 2009). 
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WebSocket is a connection-oriented protocol, which means that an established 
connection is kept open until one of the parties decides to close the connection. This 
can lead to a problem, if there is no proper defense on how many WebSocket 
connections can be opened and kept open by a single attacker. The attacker could 
use this weakness to attack against the service and exhaust resources of the service 
causing denial of service. When the service runs out of resources to open new 
WebSocket connections, it restricts legitimate users from accessing the service. 
This attack is similar to an attack published in 2009 known as Slowloris, which still 
today causes harm to HTTP servers (Wikipedia 2016). 
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5 Manual Testing of WebSocket Security 
5.1 WebSocket Security Testing Tools 
There is few security testing tools available with various features to WebSocket 
security testing. Most popular ones of these tools are the proxy tools Burp Suite and 
OWASP Zed Attack Proxy (ZAP). 
5.1.1 Burp Suite 
Burp Suite is a commercial product developed by PortSwigger for web applications’ 
security testing. According to PortSwigger (2016), Burp Suite is an integrated 
platform for performing security testing of web applications. Its various tools work 
seamlessly together to support the entire testing process, from initial mapping and 
analysis of an application's attack surface, through to finding and exploiting security 
vulnerabilities. 
Burp Suite has provided support for viewing, intercepting and modifying WebSocket 
messages on the fly since January 2014 in its version 1.4.21. However, these 
functionalities are only part of the professional edition. Figure 7 illustrates Burp 
Suite’s WebSocket history user interface. (PortSwigger 2014.) 
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Figure 7. Burp Suite’s WebSocket history user interface. 
Burp Suite is written in Java and runs on any platform that has Java Runtime 
Environment (JRE) installed. 
5.1.2 OWASP Zed Attack Proxy 
According to OWASP (2016), the OWASP Zed Attack Proxy (ZAP) is one of the world’s 
most popular free security tools and is actively maintained by hundreds of 
international volunteers. It can help you automatically find security vulnerabilities in 
web applications while developing and testing applications. 
OWASP ZAP provides support for viewing, intercepting and modifying WebSocket 
messages on the fly and afterwards. Figure 8 illustrates OWASP Zed Attack Proxy’s 
WebSocket user interface. 
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Figure 8. OWASP Zed Attack Proxy's WebSocket user interface. 
OWASP ZAP is written in Java. OWASP provides installation packages for OS X, 
Windows and Linux with a preliminary requirement that Java Runtime Environment 
(JRE) is installed. 
5.1.3 Other Tools 
There are also other tools available, but they are more for WebSocket debugging 
purposes, not really about the security testing. 
Google Chrome’s developer tools can be used for viewing WebSocket traffic. This is 
not a tool for security testing, but is a good tool for inspecting what kind of messages 
are sent in an established WebSocket connection. Figure 9 illustrates the WebSocket 
view under Chrome’s developer tools. (Google 2016.) 
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Figure 9. WebSocket traffic view in Google Chrome's developer tools. 
Websocket.org Echo Test is a web browser based tool that can be used to test the 
basic functionality of a WebSocket server. This can be used to send and receive 
messages with any WebSocket server that does not restrict the origin. Figure 10 
illustrates the tool. (Kaazing 2016.) 
 
Figure 10. Websocket.org Echo Test tool. 
Echo Test tool can be accessed from http://www.websocket.org/echo.html. It can 
also be downloaded and run from your own server. 
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5.2 Manual Testing 
5.2.1 Proxy Tool 
WebSocket security tools like Burp Suite and OWASP ZAP both utilize proxy 
functionality to achieve the needed functionality for security testing (PortSwigger 
2016; OWASP 2016). 
In scope of web security testing, proxy is a tool that can be used to reroute the traffic 
through a proxy server, acting as a middleman that can be used to view history, 
intercept, modify, or block the traffic that is occurring between the two parties. The 
proxy server is integrated into both Burp Suite and OWASP ZAP. When activated, the 
proxy server’s address must be configured to a browser in order to see the traffic 
between the two parties in the proxy tool. Figure 11 illustrates the principle of the 
proxy server functionality. 
 
Figure 11. Principle of the proxy server functionality. 
When the proxy server is configured for example to the browser client, the incoming 
and outgoing browser traffic is directed through the proxy server. Proxy server can 
freely view, intercept, modify, and block the traffic. 
It must be noted that if the proxy server is used with encrypted connections (e.g. 
HTTPS or WSS), the client must trust the certificate authority that has signed the 
proxy server’s certificate. In case of a security testing, root certificate used with the 
proxy server can be exported and installed to the client to avoid any problems with 
certificate trusts. 
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With all the following testing scenarios, it is assumed that the proxy server is 
configured in between the client and the server. 
5.2.2 Authentication 
To be able to test authentication issues in a WebSocket service the following 
knowledge about the service needs to be available: 
 Address for the WebSocket service. 
 Authentication mechanism(s) used (if such exist). 
 One set of working credentials (if such exist). 
Testing starts by opening the connection to the WebSocket service. In case of a 
browser based WebSocket service, open the web site where the WebSocket service 
is located, login to the service by using the credentials (if login is required) and the 
WebSocket connection should be established. 
Once the connection is established, the detail on how the WebSocket opening 
handshake occurred is available on the proxy server’s WebSocket history. From 
there, find the initial WebSocket client generated WebSocket opening handshake 
request and send it to a tool, which can resend the request. 
In case of Burp Suite, resending requests can be accomplished by right clicking the 
request in question and selecting “Send to Repeater”. Once the request is in 
Repeater, request can be verified for authentication related details (e.g. Cookie 
header). Figure 12 illustrates the send to repeater functionality. 
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Figure 12. Sent to Repeater functionality in Burp Suite. 
If the service uses form-based authentication, the client generated WebSocket 
opening handshake request should contain a Cookie name/value pair, or other HTTP 
header (starting with “X-“) that indicates the authenticated user to the server. An 
example header could be “Cookie: token=12583812131”. The following scenarios 
needs to be tested at minimum in order to validate the function of the 
authentication security control (others scenarios may also exist): 
 Remove the whole header from the request: 
o Cookie: token=12583812131 
 Modify the header by removing the name/value pair: 
o Cookie: token=12583812131 
 Modify the header by removing the value: 
o Cookie: token=12583812131 
 Modify the header by trying other values as the value: 
o Cookie: token=1 
o Cookie: token=0 
o Cookie: token=-1 
o Cookie: token=-0 
o Cookie: token=true 
o Cookie: token=false 
o Cookie: token=null 
o Cookie: token=%00 
Figure 13 illustrates the modifying the cookie value to be %00 (nullbyte) character. 
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Figure 13. Nullbyte as the cookie’s name/value pair’s value in Burp Suite Repeater. 
If the response to the modified request is similar to the following example, the 
service has an issue with the security control, since the authentication check can be 
bypassed: 
HTTP/1.1 101 Switching Protocols 
Upgrade: WebSocket 
Connection: Upgrade 
Sec-WebSocket-Accept: GF3mHw49oEigrTamsoUTYopfKxg= 
In case of the service’s security control working correctly, you should see HTTP status 
code “401 Unauthorized” or similar, which restricts the access to the service. 
If the service uses basic authentication, digest authentication, client certificates, or 
other similar authentication mechanisms, the testing in those scenarios is different. 
On those cases it must be verified, if the WebSocket opening handshake request can 
be done successfully without the user authentication. Once the request is known 
(found from history), Burp Suite’s Repeater can be used to make the WebSocket 
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opening handshake request similar to case of form-based authentication to verify the 
functionality of service’s authentication security control. 
Sometimes, the implementation of WebSockets service’s authentication could be a 
combination of using client certificates and form-based authentication. On those 
cases both of the authentication mechanisms must be tested for security issues. 
5.2.3 Authorization 
To be able to test authorization issues in a WebSocket service the following 
knowledge about the service needs to be available: 
 Address for the WebSocket service. 
 Authentication mechanism(s) used. 
 Two or more sets of working credentials with different level of authorization 
(e.g. normal user and admin user). 
OR 
 One set of working credentials with a normal user level of authorization and 
the knowledge of admin functions and how they are called through the 
WebSocket service. 
 If the service has user specific functions on same authorization level, two sets 
of working credentials from the same authorization level. 
Testing starts by opening the connection to the WebSocket service. In case of a 
browser based WebSocket service, open the web site where the WebSocket service 
is located, login to the service by using the credentials (if login is required) and the 
WebSocket connection should be established. 
The first thing to do is to analyze the service for what kinds of WebSocket messages 
are sent from the WebSocket client to the WebSocket server when the service is 
used normally. This includes the usage of the normal user level’s functions and 
resources as well as the functions and resources on the user level(s) above that. This 
requires that every user account from separate user levels is logged into the service 
one by one and tested separately. It is not exceptional to have three or even more 
user levels to be tested. The WebSocket message history in Burp is called 
WebSockets history and in OWASP ZAP it is called WebSockets. 
Once the collection of messages sent by all users on all user levels is available, the 
collection must be reviewed manually and compared between each user and user 
level. Usually the case is that the normal user level has access to minimum amount of 
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functions and resources and the admin has access to all functions and resources. This 
can however differ between applications. As the end result from the comparison, 
there should be a list of messages that can be sent with each user level and what are 
the messages that require the higher user level than the user level in question. E.g. 
the admin user can create a new user to the service and a user on the normal user 
level cannot. 
Once the list of available higher user level messages available, the proxy tool is used 
to send the messages to the WebSocket server and see how does it respond. Burp 
Suite does not have a feature for resending WebSocket messages. However, OWASP 
ZAP has it. Resend functionality from OWASP ZAP can be found by right clicking any 
WebSocket message and selecting Resend like Figure 14 illustrates. 
 
Figure 14. Access to Resend functionality in OWASP Zed Attack Proxy. 
Once the Resend functionality is opened, it can be used to manually send any 
message. Figure 15 illustrates the Resend functionality in OWASP ZAP. 
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Figure 15. Resend functionality in OWASP Zed Attack Proxy. 
Response to the sent message can be seen from the WebSockets history. If there is a 
response that includes any data that should only be accessible only by higher 
authorization level user or by another user only, the authorization security control is 
broken. 
It must be noted that if there is a functionality where name/value pair is used in the 
message (e.g. userId=123) and the response should only be accessible by a specific 
user within the same user level, it must be tested with another user at the same user 
level. If another user is able to receive the data that was meant for the other user, 
the security control is broken.  
OWASP ZAP also has a feature called Fuzz that can be used to run set of tests with a 
predefined list of payloads with a selected WebSocket request as separate requests 
with one payload at a time. Payload list can be loaded from a file or simply pasted to 
the tool, which can for example be used for authorization testing. Authorization 
testing manually might take a lot of time to test, so Fuzz feature is a way to ease the 
testing by automation. 
5.2.4 Cross-Domain Requesting 
To be able to test origin validation issues in a WebSocket service the following 
knowledge about the service needs to be available: 
 Address for the WebSocket service. 
 Authentication mechanism(s) used (if such exist). 
 One set of working credentials (if such exist). 
Issues related to cross-domain requesting are easy to test. By default in WebSockets, 
the only thing that controls the cross-domain requesting is the Origin header. Origin 
header is sent within the WebSocket opening handshake request by the WebSocket 
client and validated by the WebSocket server. Proxy tools can manipulate the 
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request headers freely. However, in some cases, the source from where the service 
can be called is not limited for a reason. In those cases the testing of origin validation 
is not necessary. 
Testing starts by opening the connection to the WebSocket service. In case of a 
browser based WebSocket service, open the web site where the WebSocket service 
is located, login to the service by using the credentials (if login is required) and the 
WebSocket connection should be established. 
Once you have the connection established, review the proxy history and find out the 
WebSocket opening handshake request and send it to Burp’s Repeater or ZAP’s 
Resend tool. From the request change the Origin header’s value to something else 
than it originally was. Figure 16 illustrates Origin modified WebSocket opening 
handshake request in the Burp Repeater tool. 
 
Figure 16. Origin modified WebSocket opening handshake request in Burp Repeater. 
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If the response to the modified request is similar to the following example, the 
service has an origin validation security issue, since the origin is not validated: 
HTTP/1.1 101 Switching Protocols 
Upgrade: WebSocket 
Connection: Upgrade 
Sec-WebSocket-Accept: GF3mHw49oEigrTamsoUTYopfKxg= 
In case of the service’s security control working correctly, response’s HTTP status 
code is “401 Unauthorized” or similar, which restricts the access to the service from 
unauthorized origins. 
5.2.5 Traffic Encryption 
If a WebSocket service is not using TLS encrypted connection (URI: wss://) to the 
WebSocket service by default, it should be tested if the service supports TLS 
encrypted connections at all. 
To be able to test traffic encryption issues in the WebSocket service the following 
knowledge about the service needs to be available: 
 Address for the WebSocket service. 
 Authentication mechanism(s) used (if such exist). 
 One set of working credentials (if such exist). 
Once you have the connection established, look at the proxy history and find out the 
WebSocket opening handshake request and send it to Burp’s Repeater. Once the 
request is in repeater, select Configure target details and change a proper port and 
select Use HTTPS. Figure 17 illustrates the Configure target details view in Burp 
Repeater tool. 
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Figure 17. Configure target details view in Burp Repeater. 
If the response to the modified request is similar to the following example, the 
service is working with TLS encryption also: 
HTTP/1.1 101 Switching Protocols 
Upgrade: WebSocket 
Connection: Upgrade 
Sec-WebSocket-Accept: GF3mHw49oEigrTamsoUTYopfKxg= 
In all services where TLS encryption is not used by default or TLS is not supported at 
all, it is a security issue. Encryption should always be used. 
5.2.6 Input Validation 
To be able to test input validation issues in a WebSocket service the following 
knowledge about the service needs to be available: 
 Address for the WebSocket service. 
 Authentication mechanism(s) used (if such exist). 
 Set of working credentials for every user authorization level (if such exist). 
Testing starts by opening the connection to the WebSocket service. In case of a 
browser based WebSocket service, open the web site where the WebSocket service 
is located, login to the service by using the credentials (if login is required) and the 
WebSocket connection should be established. 
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The first thing to do is to analyze the service for what kinds of WebSocket messages 
are sent from the WebSocket client to the WebSocket server when the service is 
used normally (this includes all the messages that are sent on all user authorization 
levels). 
Once you have a list of messages used by the service, it must be reviewed for 
potentially problematic messages from input validation perspective. In theory every 
message could be injectable, but due to time or scope limitations they might need to 
be filtered. In those cases, a prioritization must be done for most potential 
problematic ones. For example, if there is a message with a content userId=123, it 
should be a good starting point for input validation testing. 
To be able to test the message, a list of malicious payloads must be available that are 
used fuzz for potential issues in input validation. Fuzz testing should contain tests 
against different kind of vulnerabilities (e.g. SQL injection, XSS, Path traversal, and 
similar). For traditional web applications, these kinds of fuzz tests are integrated to 
Burp Suite’s and OWASP ZAP’s features (active scan), but using them with 
WebSocket have limitations. Since the Burp Suite does not support resending of 
WebSocket messages, an effective testing cannot be done with it. This is why OWASP 
ZAP is a better choice for this. 
When there is a list of payloads available, automated testing can be accomplished by 
using OWASP ZAP’s Fuzz tool with a customized payload list. In most cases the better 
way to approach this testing is to do it manually. Figure 18 illustrates Resend feature 
in OWASP ZAP with manually added example SQL injection payload. 
 
Figure 18. WebSocket message resend feature in OWASP Zed Attack Proxy. 
The payload used in the Figure 18 tries to inject ‘ -character into the interpreted SQL 
code. The result for a sent message must be validated from WebSockets history for 
potentially problematic responses. If the response for the sent message returns a 
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SQL error message, it might be SQL injectable and would require some more testing 
to validate if that really is the case. 
Input validation test scenarios with different payloads require deeper knowledge of 
different kind of vulnerabilities, how they can be tested and how they might impact 
the system. It is not efficient to describe all the possible payloads for every single 
type of vulnerabilities in this research, since the amount of them is huge and they are 
also highly context dependent. 
5.2.7 Resource Exhaustion 
To be able to test resource exhaustion issues in a WebSocket service the following 
knowledge about the service needs to be available: 
 Address for the WebSocket service. 
 Authentication mechanism(s) used (if such exist). 
 Set of working credentials for every user authorization level (if such exist). 
Starting point for testing is that multiple WebSocket connections must be established 
in order to perform the testing. At first, it must be tested if active WebSocket 
connections are limited to one connection per session or not.  
In case the service is usable with a web browser and the service’s own JavaScript 
code handles the WebSocket opening handshake request, it can be easily tested by 
opening the same service to multiple tabs and validating if it is usable in every tab. If 
the service is not a browser application, automation scripts must be written. Such 
scripts can utilize the JavaScript WebSocket API integrated into browsers or other 3rd 
party libraries available for different programming languages. For Python there is a 
library called websocket (part of websocket-client) that can be utilized for this kind of 
testing. 
A JavaScript based testing tool to be used with the WebSocket API can be created 
with a few lines of JavaScript code. One example of this kind of testing tool can be 
found from the simple-websocket-server project. The tool is an html page containing 
JavaScript code for opening any WebSocket connection, reading messages, sending 
messages and closing the connection. The JavaScript based testing tool’s source code 
can be found from appendix 1. (Pallot 2015.) 
54 
 
 
If the service is checking the Origin before establishing the connection, the Origin 
must be manipulated. The Origin manipulation can be accomplished for example 
with Burp Suite proxy while doing the testing. Figure 19 illustrates the manipulation 
of Origin in Burp Suite. Same tool can be used for adding an authentication header if 
is needed for the testing. 
 
Figure 19. The Origin manipulation with Burp Suite. 
A Python based testing tool can also be written with few lines of code. Code below 
illustrates a WebSocket client that can be used to open the WebSocket connection 
and send WebSocket messages (Github 2014): 
from __future__ import print_function 
import websocket 
 
if __name__ == "__main__": 
    websocket.enableTrace(True) 
    ws = websocket.create_connection("ws://ws-example-site.com/") 
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    print("Sending 'Hello, World'...") 
    ws.send("Hello, World") 
    print("Sent") 
    print("Receiving...") 
    result = ws.recv() 
    print("Received '%s'" % result) 
    ws.close() 
The Origin manipulation can be accomplished by giving the Origin as an argument to 
the websocket.create_connection function. Adding a custom header (e.g. 
authentication header) can be added the same way. Example for this below: 
 options[“origin”] = “example-domain.com” 
options[“header] = [“Cookie: token=125838121231”] 
websocket.create_connection("ws://ws-example-site.com/", 
**options) 
Both the scripts are meant for opening one connection per running script to the 
service. To use them to open multiple connections at the same time, the scripts must 
be modified based on the specific use case. In some cases, it is simply enough to run 
the same script simultaneously. For example, the JavaScript based script was tested 
in the Firefox browser by opening it to the browser for 200 times to separate tabs 
without any problems, which is enough for most of the testing cases. Figure 20 
illustrates this situation from the WebSocket server point of view. 
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Figure 20. WebSocket server's log when multiple connections are opened by one 
WebSocket client from the same source. 
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6 Customized Tool for WebSockets Security Testing 
6.1 Preliminary Analysis 
The first step in developing the new tool is to set the requirements for what the tool 
should be able to perform. The following are the requirements that were set for the 
tool. 
Easy to implement. From the development point of view the tool must be easy to 
implement. This includes a programming language that must be easy to program and 
if possible, have previous knowledge about the selected programming language. 
Chosen programming language for this tool was Python, because it is a really easy 
language to understand and the previous experience I have programming with it. 
Cross-platform support. It must be possible to run the tool on different platforms 
like Windows, OS X and Linux, without unnecessary dependencies to 3rd parties.  
WebSocket client-side libraries available. The selected programming language must 
have Websocket client-side libraries available, because it is not reasonable to 
implement them from a scratch during this project. Python has a library called 
websocket, which is part of the websocket-client package that can handle all the 
client-side traffic needed for this tool.  
Extensibility and support for the future. The tool must be programmed in a way that 
it can be extended for new features in future. If for example the WebSocket 
specification is updated or if there is need for a new feature. 
The tool must be easy to use. The tool that is going to be developed must be easy to 
use. This does not mean that there should be a graphical user interface, but instead 
should be a clear way to use it from terminal/console. As a user of the tool there is 
no need to do any changes to the actual script’s code when using it in various 
scenarios. 
The tool has basic features for WebSocket security testing. The tool must be able to 
test different kind of problematic security related scenarios, either automatically or 
manually. These features include: 
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 Request header manipulation testing. 
 Traffic encryption testing. 
 Cross-domain requesting testing (Origin validation). 
 Manual input validation testing. 
 Logging of all requests. 
6.2 Design 
In order to implement the tool in an effective way, the decisions how the tool is 
going to be implemented were decided during the design phase. Design phase 
includes what kind of user interface will be created, what kind of logic flows are 
there, the different functions implemented and so on. 
6.2.1 User Interface 
User interface for the tool will be a non-graphical terminal/console –text based tool. 
User must be able provide the needed details for basic testing as attributes. 
Launching of the tool must occur like following: 
 python ws_security_tester.py -attribute1 value -attribute1 value 
If the user does not know the parameter, available parameters can be printed with -h 
parameter. Help printing must occur like following: 
python ws_security_tester.py -h 
Result: 
positional arguments 
argument_name argument description 
optional arguments 
-argument  argument description 
Once the script is launched, a small description about the tool is printed to user’s 
terminal/console.  This must include the name of the tool and what where the 
arguments provided by the user during the launch. 
If there is a need to ask some specific questions (interactive user input), those are 
asked after printing the description. Questions can be asked as yes/no questions 
where user can write the input. If yes/no is not suitable, other input can also be 
asked and supplied by the user. 
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Once all the needed details are in place, the testing starts and the status about what 
is occurring is informed interactively on user interface. 
There must be a way for the user to stop the execution of the test and user must be 
informed about this possibility. 
6.2.2 Functions 
In order for the tool to work, it must have different kind of security testing functions. 
The following functions must be implemented. 
Open WebSocket connection. The function must be able to open a connection to 
any WebSocket server. Server can be used either with ws:// (non-encrypted) or 
wss:// (encrypted) connection. It must also support manipulation of the Origin 
header and adding of any custom header. User provided subprotocols must be 
supported as well. 
Close WebSocket connection. If requested by the user or by the WebSocket server, it 
must be possible to close the WebSocket connection. 
Send and receive messages and keep the connection alive. The tool must be able to 
send user provided messages, receive server provided messages and keep the 
connection alive (ping/pong frames). Messages sent as UTF-8 encoded text (opcode 
0x1) as well as binary (opcode 0x2) formatted must be supported. 
Log data. The tool must be able to log any data that is sent to a log function and at 
the same time log all the WebSocket messages while the WebSocket connection is 
established. Log must be written to a file. 
Print data. The tool must be able to print data to the user interface for informational 
purposes. 
User input. The tool must be able to ask for user input and handle it. 
Proxy support. The tool must be able to support the usage of HTTP proxies. 
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6.2.3 Logic Flow of the Tool 
The tool must follow a specific logic flow during the whole execution. Figure 21 
illustrates the logic flow in the tool. 
 
Figure 21. Logic flow chart of the tool. 
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6.3 Implementation 
6.3.1 Wsdump Tool 
Originally the idea for the implementation was to write the whole tool from a 
scratch, but during the initial steps of implementation I found a tool, which was 
almost the same as what the whole implementation was all about. The tool is called 
wsdump.py and is a part of the open-source websocket-client package, which 
contain the websocket library. (Liris 2016.) 
Wsdump.py is a Python script, which was developed for testing purposes to be used 
with websocket library. Initially it is not meant for the security testing. 
6.3.2 Programming the Tool 
From implementation point of view this tool was to be modified for security testing 
purposes. By default, Wsdump provided support for many of the needed features, 
but not logging at all. 
Like described in design phase the tool must be able to log all WebSocket messages 
that are being sent during the testing. This also includes the WebSocket opening 
handshake request and response. 
The first thing is to add the logging possibility to the tool. Logging is a Python library 
that can be used for this case. In order to provide the functionality, the following 
code was needed: 
Import logging library: 
 import logging 
Define a new argument for logging: 
 def parse_args(): 
  … 
  parser.add_argument("log_file", metavar="log_file_path", 
                                help="log file path. e.g. filename.txt") 
  … 
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Define a write_log function: 
def write_log(data): 
 logging.info(data) 
Set logging configuration: 
def main(): 
  … 
logging.basicConfig( 
  filename=args.log_file, 
  level=logging.DEBUG, 
  format = "%(message)s", 
  datefmt='%d-%b %H:%M:%S', 
  ) 
  … 
When the basic configuration for logging was in place, the next step is to log all the 
needed messages. It can be accomplished with the written write_log function. 
Logging was added to all necessary parts of the tool. An example of logging usage is 
following: 
write_log('Script start time: %s' % time.ctime()) 
As a second additional feature, support for custom headers was to be added. With it 
any custom header can be added. For example in cases where authentication is 
needed, there needs to be a Cookie header with key/value pair or similar. In order to 
provide the functionality, the following code was written: 
Define a new argument for the custom header: 
 def parse_args(): 
  … 
  parser.add_argument("--header", action="store_true", 
      help="Custom header e.g. Cookie: 
token=1234567890") 
… 
63 
 
 
Add check for the argument and add it to connection options if exist: 
 if (args.header): 
  options[“header”] = args.header 
 
Later on options are used in the connection opening: 
 ws = websocket.create_connection(args.url, sslopt=opts, **options) 
As a third feature a check if the Origin was not provided as an argument was added. 
This feature asks a question from the user to confirm on how the Origin is to be used. 
By default the Origin is set to the WebSocket services address (e.g. http://127.0.0.1). 
 if (args.origin): 
  options["origin"] = args.origin 
 else: 
  print("\nOrigin not provided, please provide it here or set 
        it with -o parameter. If not provided, example-        
             domain.com will be used.") 
  write_log("\nOrigin not provided, please provide it here 
 or set it with -o parameter. If not provided, 
 example-domain.com will be used.") 
  origin_question = "" 
  while origin_question not in ("yes", "no"): 
   print('Do you want to provide it here 
         (yes/no?)') 
   origin_question = raw_input() 
  if origin_question == "yes": 
   print("\nOrigin (e.g. example- 
            domain.com):") 
   options["origin"] = raw_input() 
   write_log ("User provided origin: %s" %  
                      options["origin"]) 
  else: 
   options["origin"] = "example-domain.com" 
64 
 
 
   print("Origin not provided, example- 
            domain.com will be used.") 
   write_log("Origin not provided, example- 
                 domain.com will be used.") 
As the fourth feature, interface messages about what is happening in the tool 
execution was added. Example message: 
print("\nConnection opened successfully to " + args.url + "\n") 
With all the mentioned changes the tool is in a state where it can be used for the 
security testing. 
6.4 Testing 
The testing of the tool mainly occurred during the implementation phase of every 
new feature. The functions that were already implemented to Wsdump tool 
previously were tested for the necessary part also. This included opening a 
WebSocket connection, sending WebSocket messages and receiving WebSocket 
messages in both UTF-8 encoded text and binary format, as well as routing the traffic 
through a proxy server. 
When testing any of the new features added to the tool, testing was done with a 
local WebSocket server to confirm the functionality. From testing point of view all of 
the new functionalities were simple to test with this setup. Burp Suite was used as 
the proxy tool during the testing. 
Logging functionality was tested by adding new items to be logged one by one. 
Operability of a new log item was easy to confirm by simply reviewing the log file, 
which was generated during the tool execution. All problems that existed with this 
feature were easy to fix. 
Functionality of adding a custom header was tested by adding a new custom header 
as an argument and confirming the operability. The custom header was confirmed 
from WebSocket opening handshake that was logged Burp Suite history or by 
reviewing the log file. 
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Functionality of the Origin verification was tested by testing the two possible inputs 
(yes / no) one by one and confirming the sent Origin header within the WebSocket 
opening handshake from Burp Suite history or by reviewing the log file. 
Functionality of printed messages in user interface was validated by simply running 
the tool and reviewing the printed messages visually. 
6.5 Usage 
To use the tool, Python (tested with version 2.7) must be installed to the system with 
the following libraries available: 
 argparse 
 code 
 six 
 sys 
 threading 
 time 
 websocket 
 logging. 
Using help. Help for the tool can be launched like following: 
python ws_security_tester.py -h 
Example result: 
WebSocket Security Testing Tool 
positional arguments: 
ws_url  websocket url. e.g. 
ws://echo.websocket.org/ 
log_file_path  log file path. e.g. filename.txt 
optional arguments: 
-h, --help  show this help message and exit 
-p PROXY, --proxy PROXY proxy url. e.g. http://127.0.0.1:8080 
-v [VERBOSE], --verbose [VERBOSE] 
set verbose mode. If set to 1, show opcode. If 
set to 2, enable to trace websocket module 
-n, --nocert  Ignore invalid SSL cert 
-r, --raw  ws console with raw output 
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-c, --console  ws console with cleartext output 
-s [SUBPROTOCOLS [SUBPROTOCOLS ...]], --subprotocols 
[SUBPROTOCOLS [SUBPROTOCOLS ...]] 
Set subprotocols 
-o ORIGIN, --origin ORIGIN Set origin e.g. test.domain.com 
--eof-wait EOF_WAIT wait time(second) after 'EOF' received. 
-t TEXT, --text TEXT Send initial text 
--timings  Print timings in seconds 
--header  Custom header e.g. Cookie: 
token=1234567890 
Starting the tool. Tool starts by launching it from terminal/console with the following 
command: 
 Python ws_security_tester.py [arguments] ws_url log_file 
Startup banner. The tool prints a banner giving all the information about the 
arguments provided during the startup. The banner is illustrated in Figure 22. 
 
Figure 22. Banner shown during the tool launch. 
Origin verification. If the user does not provide the origin within the launch 
arguments, the user is asked a verification about how to handle origin. Figure 23 
illustrates the functionality. 
 
Figure 23. Origin verification. 
WebSocket opening handshake request and response. When the WebSocket 
handshake is happening, the handshake request and response are printed to the user 
interface for inspection. Figure 24 illustrates the functionality. 
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Figure 24. WebSocket opening handshake on the user interface. 
Sending messages. Once the WebSocket connection is established, messages can be 
sent to the WebSocket connection by simply typing the message and sending it by 
pressing enter. Figure 25 illustrates communication between a Python client and 
another client who is connected to the same WebSocket session from another 
source. 
 
Figure 25. WebSocket messaging with another client. 
Log data. The tool provides a log file, which can be used later on to review what 
happened during the WebSocket connection. Figure 26 illustrates the functionality. 
68 
 
 
 
Figure 26. Log file from the tool. 
Problem situations. If the tool cannot establish a WebSocket connection, it informs 
the user about it by testing with different arguments. Figure 27 illustrates the 
situation. 
  
Figure 27. Failed WebSocket connection establishment. 
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7 Results 
The initial requirements for the tool required the capability to handle different kinds 
of security testing scenarios. All the features included in the requirements were 
successfully implemented in the tool. In order to confirm the reliability of the results 
reported by the tool, all the tests were performed to record all the traffic handled by 
the tool and reviewing them for any errors. 
Now that the tool is complete it can be used in WebSocket security testing 
assignments to improve testing efficiency (time- and nerve-wise). The tool can 
handle all the relevant security testing scenarios involving a WebSocket service 
during a penetration test. However, the user of the tool must have a sufficient 
understanding of how the WebSocket protocol works, limiting the usability of the 
tool. This is not a problem as the tool was intended to be used by experts in the web 
application security testing field. 
Before the existence of this tool, testing the security of WebSocket services required 
use of tools that were suboptimal for this purpose. This tool will ease and comfort 
the testing process in the future. In every aspect this tool is beneficial for future 
testing of WebSocket services. Currently the tool is only available for internal use at 
Silverskin Information Security. 
From every point of view, the developed tool and the research was a success. 
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8 Conclusion 
The main objective of this master’s thesis was to research if it is possible to develop a 
tool to ease the security testing of WebSocket services. In order to implement the 
tool the following questions had to be answered: 
 How does the WebSocket protocol work? 
 What are the common vulnerabilities in WebSocket services? 
 What are the security testing tools available for WebSocket testing? 
 How can the vulnerabilities be tested with WebSocket security testing tools? 
The WebSocket protocol technical specification and other literature were reviewed 
in order to understand how the protocol works. The specification was heavy to read 
but researching the specification thoroughly helped a lot in understanding the 
protocol and its potential security issues. 
The available literature was reviewed to discover the vulnerabilities commonly found 
in WebSocket services but it did not introduce a comprehensive set of possible 
vulnerabilities. A better source for information was to review articles found on the 
Web that were written mostly by independent security researchers. At this point the 
researcher’s previous experience in web application penetration testing was a huge 
help in understanding what the vulnerabilities are, how can they be exploited, and 
the impact of someone exploiting them. 
Finding tools suitable for WebSocket security testing was the easiest phases of this 
research since the information was widely available on vendors’ web sites. Using 
these tools in WebSocket security testing was more difficult, because in order to test 
a WebSocket service, a server needed to be running a WebSocket service, that at the 
same time was vulnerable to a specific kind of vulnerability. The other fact was that 
the researcher had to have an understanding of how the tools worked with 
WebSocket security testing. 
Once all the previous phases of the research were completed, the actual 
development of the tool began. The first step was to perform a preliminary analysis 
of the features required for the tool. This analysis was relatively easy to perform due 
to the information previously gathered on the vulnerabilities commonly found in 
WebSocket services. 
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From there the next phase was the design phase that was used to plan what the 
application should look like, how it can it be used, and what technologies should the 
tool use in order to work properly. This phase took more time than the preliminary 
analysis, since a design had to be drawn, choose a programming language, review the 
libraries available for the programming language, among others. 
The next phase was the actual implementation phase of the tool. During the first 
steps of implementation, a tool was found that already supported several of the 
required features. The tool was a non-security WebSocket testing and was chosen as 
the base for the new tool. This shortened the development time by a large margin. 
New features of the tool were tested while implementing them in the tool. The 
testing phase was easy and there were no severe problems during the testing phase. 
The development process resulted in a new WebSocket service testing tool able to 
test for the commonly found security vulnerabilities in WebSocket services. While 
the amount of programming needed to implement the functionality was not massive, 
it was still educational.  
Some of the objectives set for this thesis were easy to understand and document and 
others were heavy learning experiences and time-consuming. The researcher’s 
previous knowledge in web application security testing was extremely beneficial, 
because some of the security vulnerabilities and tools were well-known. Otherwise 
this research could have been too large a project to handle with all the limitations 
set. 
Using the design research based approach with qualitative methodologies was the 
correct choice for this research. It supported the overall process of developing the 
tool as well as documenting the process in the form of this thesis. In retrospective, 
spending the hours developing the custom tool and searching for the right ways to 
implement was overall a great experience.  
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9 Future Research 
Currently the state of security of WebSocket services is stable, meaning no new types 
of vulnerabilities have been found lately. However, if a new type of vulnerability is 
found in a WebSocket service, it must be verified whether the tool is already able to 
test for the scenario. If not, then it needs to be investigated how the support for 
testing the new scenario can be implemented. 
There are at least two features that could be seen as valuable in the future. One of 
them is making the tool more automated. Currently the tool is used manually for the 
most part, meaning that the user must know how to use the tool properly and what 
kind of arguments to use in certain situations. Improving automation of the tool 
would require an extensive mapping of what sort of functions the tool should be able 
to perform automatically. Only after that it can be implemented. However, not all 
tests should be automated, as the ways a WebSocket service can be implemented in 
varies a lot. Some services may use WebSocket only for video streaming, and one 
may use it for direct database access. 
Another interesting addition to the tool would be support for fuzzing with preset 
payloads. Currently the arguments support one initial WebSocket message when 
launching the tool. It could be expanded to support a set of messages that would 
then be sent when the WebSocket connection is established. Currently the fuzzing 
feature only supports manually typed payloads. 
Other than these, there are no known features that would provide a clear 
improvement to the functionality of the tool. 
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Appendices 
Appendice 1. simple-web-socket-client – websocket.html 
<!DOCTYPE html> 
<meta charset="utf-8" /> 
<title>WebSocket Test</title> 
<script language="javascript" type="text/javascript"> 
  function init() 
  { 
 document.myform.url.value = "ws://localhost:8000/" 
 document.myform.inputtext.value = "Hello World!" 
 document.myform.disconnectButton.disabled = true; 
  } 
  function doConnect() 
  { 
    websocket = new WebSocket(document.myform.url.value); 
    websocket.onopen = function(evt) { onOpen(evt) }; 
    websocket.onclose = function(evt) { onClose(evt) }; 
    websocket.onmessage = function(evt) { onMessage(evt) }; 
    websocket.onerror = function(evt) { onError(evt) }; 
  } 
  function onOpen(evt) 
  { 
    writeToScreen("connected\n"); 
 document.myform.connectButton.disabled = true; 
 document.myform.disconnectButton.disabled = false; 
  } 
  function onClose(evt) 
  { 
    writeToScreen("disconnected\n"); 
 document.myform.connectButton.disabled = false; 
 document.myform.disconnectButton.disabled = true; 
  } 
  function onMessage(evt) 
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  { 
    writeToScreen("response: " + evt.data + '\n'); 
  } 
  function onError(evt) 
  { 
    writeToScreen('error: ' + evt.data + '\n'); 
 websocket.close(); 
 document.myform.connectButton.disabled = false; 
 document.myform.disconnectButton.disabled = true; 
  } 
  function doSend(message) 
  { 
    writeToScreen("sent: " + message + '\n');  
    websocket.send(message); 
  } 
  function writeToScreen(message) 
  { 
    document.myform.outputtext.value += message 
 document.myform.outputtext.scrollTop = 
document.myform.outputtext.scrollHeight; 
  } 
  window.addEventListener("load", init, false); 
   function sendText() { 
  doSend( document.myform.inputtext.value ); 
   } 
  function clearText() { 
  document.myform.outputtext.value = ""; 
   } 
   function doDisconnect() { 
  websocket.close(); 
   } 
</script> 
 
<div id="output"></div> 
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<form name="myform"> 
<p> 
<textarea name="outputtext" rows="20" cols="50"></textarea> 
</p> 
<p> 
<textarea name="inputtext" cols="50"></textarea> 
</p> 
<p> 
<textarea name="url" cols="50"></textarea> 
</p> 
<p> 
<input type="button" name=sendButton value="Send" onClick="sendText();"> 
<input type="button" name=clearButton value="Clear" onClick="clearText();"> 
<input type="button" name=disconnectButton value="Disconnect" 
onClick="doDisconnect();"> 
<input type="button" name=connectButton value="Connect" 
onClick="doConnect();"> 
</p> 
</form> 
</html> 
